**The consciousness debate**

What sort of consciousness is Chalmers discussing?

*phenomenal consciousness -*  having the “what it is like” part of experiences

*The problem for conscious uploads*

Imagine that we perfectly map out the neural structures that have to do with taste in your brain. We build a machine that works just like your tongue, and when it “tastes” something, sends signals to a simulated neural structure. However, the simulated neural structure is not implemented by a computer. Instead, for each neuron, there is a single person who is given a set of rules for what to do when they get various “inputs” and “outputs.” The rules perfectly simulate the behavior of the real neuron. When each person in the system follows all the rules exactly, the whole group is a perfect simulation of what happens in your brain when you taste something.

The tongue machine is given some excellent gelato. Does the system experience the taste of gelato?

*The argument for conscious uploads*

1. Assume that consciousness gradually fades as neurons are replaced by simulated neurons.
2. In principle, we can perfectly simulate the behavior of neurons using machines or software.
	1. These simulated neurons behave exactly like real neurons.
3. If 1 and 2 are both truth, then the individual being uploaded gradually would slowly lose consciousness while not noticing this at all (while not acting any differently).
4. 3 is implausible.
5. So, either 1 or 2 is false. Chalmers rejects 1 (he rejects gradual fading).
6. If a person is fully conscious, the loss of a single neuron is not going to fully deprive them of consciousness.
7. So, there’s no point in the uploading process at which consciousness is lost.

*Anosognosia*

*Anton’s syndrome*

**The identity debate**

1. If A’s mind is uploaded, but the original A is not destroyed, then A is not identical to the uploaded version.
2. Uploading with destruction is not different (with regards to identity) than uploading without destruction.
3. So, if A’s mind is uploaded and the original is destroyed, the uploaded version is not A.
4. The loss of a single neuron is not going to end persistence of a person.
5. So, in very gradual destructive uploading, the person persists through the upload.
6. There’s no difference between very gradual destructive uploading and very fast destructive uploading.
7. So, a person can persist through very fast destructive uploading.